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NOTES
EFFECT OF IMPOSSIBILITY ON CRIMINAL ATTEMPT
The modern conception of the effect of impossibility of
consummation of an attempted crime is well illustrated by two
recent cases. In State v. Block," the defendant was accused of
attempting to obtain property under false pretenses from an
insurance company, under a clam for an injury winch had never
occurred. The court held the defendant not guilty on the
ground that it was not shown that a policy existed, and that
-without a policy, recovery for the alleged injury was impossible.
There was no apparent possibility of success, and the defendant
must have known this, since he knew there was no policy The
court ruled that the defendant's actions did not constitute a
criminal attempt, since there was, from his point of view, no
possibility of consummating the crime.
State v. Wrsght2 is in many particulars similar to State v.
Block in that tins case also concerns an attempt to defraud an
insurance company where no policy was in existence. Wright
was indicted for murder committed in the course of a felony,
and the question arose as to whether ins actions constituted the
felony of attempting to obtain property under false pretenses.
Although it was proved that consummation of the felony was
impossible, the court held Wright guilty The theory employed
by the court was that Wright was ignorant of the non-existence
of the insurance policy, and from ins viewpoint there was an
apparent possibility of ins succeeding in committing the fraud.
The court held Wright guilty because success was apparently
possible from ins point of view, even though it was actually
impossible.
In these two cases the effect of impossibility of consumma-
tion was made to depend on whether or not the defendant in each
case knew of the impossibility 2  Tins is in accord with the
'333 Mo. 127, 62 S. W (2d) 428 (1933).
'342 Mo. 58, 112 S. W (2d) 571 (1937)
Since this note deals only with the effect of impossibility, the
existence of all other necessary elements of a crnmnal attempt, such
as specific intent and an overt act going beyond mere preparation, is
assumed.
CRImINAL ATTEMPT-IMPoSSIBILITY
majority of recent cases dealing with this point, which hold that
reasonable anticipation of success on the part of the defendant
is the deciding factor. If the defendant knows or should as a
reasonable man know that success is impossible with the means
he is using, he cannot be guilty of a criminal attempt, while if
he reasonably believes he can consummate the crime by such
means, he is guilty 4
The idea of holding a person guilty of an attempt when
consummation was impossible seems to have first arisen in cases
involving pickpockets. In Rogers v. Commonwealth5 the court
held it to be a well settled principal of law that a person can be
held guilty of an attempt to pick a pocket when in fact there is
nothing in the pocket of the person he is trying to rob. The court
justified this holding by saying that the defendant had the
intention to steal something, and the fact that there was nothing
to steal does not excuse the intent to steal. If this line of reason-
mg is followed, it would seem that one could be held guilty of an
attempt to commit any crime, regardless of impossibility, if
intent can be shown. But the courts seem to have regarded
attempts to pick pockets as being in a separate class in regard
to this point. In Commonwealth v. McDonald,6 another at-
tempted pick-pocket case, the court said that here there was no
need to show that there was anything in the pocket of the
intended victim, but if the defendant had been accused of an
attempt to commit some other form of larceny, it may have been
necessary to show goods which the defendant was attempting to
steal. In State v Wilson the court distinguished an attempt to
pick a pocket which was empty from an attempt to defraud by
means which could not possibly defraud anyone and attempts to
poison by using a non-poisonous substance, by saying that in the
last two situations consummation was "legally impossible",
while in the case of an attempt to pick a pocket which was
'People v. Hickman, 31 Cal. App. 4, 87 P (2d) 80 (1939), People
v. Huff, 339 Ill. 328, 171 N. E. 261 (1930), Stokes v. State, 92 Miss.
415, 46 So. 627 (1908), State v. Addor, 183 N. C. 687, 110 S. E. 650(1922), Trent v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1128, 156 S. E. 567 (1931),
State v. Peterson, 109 Wash. 25, 186 Pac. 264 (1919).
55 Sargeant & Rawles 462 (Pa. 1820).
05 Cush. 365, 368 (Mass. 1850). "This decision is confined to
the particular case under consideration, of an attempt to steal from
the person; as there may perhaps be cases of attempts to steal, when
it would be necessary to set out the particular property attempted to
be stolen, and the value."
"30 Conn. 500 (1862).
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empty, consummation was "legally possible", though actually
impossible. However, the court failed to state the formula by
which it distinguished "legal possibility" from "legal
impossibility"
Originally an attempt to poison by using a non-poisonous
substance was not punishable as attempted murder, and the
Alabama court so held in State v. Clarnssa,s where the indictment
failed to charge that the substance used was poisonous. The
court held that the attempt must be made by means calculated
to accomplish the purpose, and that it was necessary that the
person against whom the attempt was made be placed in
jeopardy But just three years later an English court held in
Regvna v. Cluderay9 that the fact that a non-poisonous substance
was used would not prevent the defendant's conviction, since he
administered the substance which he thought was poisonous
with intent to kill in a manner which he thought would produce
death. In State v. GloverO the South Carolina court ruled like-
wise in a sinilar situation. This view has been generally followed
in recent cases involving this point..i
What has been said would indicate that courts began about
a century ago to get away from the old view that impossibility
of consummation would prevent conviction for a crminal at-
tempt, and that m the past forty years there has been a general
trend in this direction. The test now is whether the defendant
reasonably expected to succeed with the means he was using,
rather than whether he could have succeeded. If the expectation
of success can be clearly shown, the courts will disregard the fact
that consummation is actually impossible in determining whether
an attempt has been committed.
The only cases m which impossibility will be a defense are
those in which it is shown that the defendant, as a reasonable
man, must know that his act cannot possibly bring about the
consummation of the intended act. Impossibility now plays only
a minor role in the law of attempts, and perhaps the only reason
for its having any role at all is that if the defendant knows that
he cannot succeed with the means he is using, it cannot be shown
'11 Ala. 57 (1847).
"2 Car. & K. 907, 4 Cox C. C. 84 (1850).
1027 S. C. 602, 4 S. E. 564 (1888).
"People v. Huff, 339 Ill. 328, 171 N. E. 261 (1930) Stokes v.
State, 92 Miss. 415, 46 So. 627 (1908), State v Ready, 116 S. C. 177,
96 S. E. 287 (1918).
CRfImNAL ATTEMPT-IMPossIBILITY
that he has the necessary specific intent to commit the crime,
for it cannot be said that a man intends as the result of Ins act
that which he knows to be physically impossible. It would be
ridiculous to say that the defendant intended to kill another by
putting sugar into Ins coffee, when he knew that the substance
he used was sugar, and not arsemc. The effect of proving that
consummation was impossible, and that the defendant knew that
consummation was impossible, is to prove the defendant did not
have the necessary intent.
The better -iew would seem to be that impossibility of
consummation will not prevent a conviction, unless it can be
inferred from the defendant's knowledge of tins impossibility
that he did not intend that a crime result from his act. There is
very little difference between one who shoots at another with a
gun which, unknown to hun, is loaded with blanks rather than
bullets, and one who fires a loaded gun at another, but misses
because a bystander knocks the gun aside. In each case the
intent to kill and an overt act which would produce the desired
result if it were not for unforeseen circumstances are present.
Impossibility of consummation should have no greater effect in
one case than in the other. The defendants in both cases should
be held guilty The defendant's attitude toward his act is the
important element. If the intent is established, and the defend-
ant's act has gone far enough toward accomplishing his purpose
so that it can be said that they constitute more than mere
preparation, it can certainly be said that a crimnial attempt has
been committed, regardless of the impossibility of consummation.
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